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ABSTRACT 
  
HRM developed in response to the substantial increase in competitive pressures American business 
organizations began experiencing by the late 1970s as a result of such factors as globalization, deregulation, 
and rapid technological change. These pressures gave rise to an enhanced concern on the part of firms to 
engage in strategic planning. This research focuses on the history or evolution of human resource management 
development. Its changing phase over time and the extent to which new dimensions and knowledge can be 
harnessed and optimised for professional use  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The impact of financial development on economic 
growth is an important public policy issue. A key 
issue is whether financial development spurs 
economic growth, or even is a prerequisite for 
economic growth? As is by now well established, 
financial development is an important facilitator of 
economic growth. Having well functioning financial 
institutions (and markets) is considered important for 
the economy at large and the financing of 
corporations in particular. Also financial instruments 
as manifestations of financial development can be of 
considerable importance. In particular, some 
financial instruments are explicitly designed to 
facilitate underlying real transactions. For example, 
commercial letters of credit are an indispensable part 
of import-export transactions. These instruments 
effectively guarantee payment upon delivery of 
goods which make exporting companies willing to let 
go of their goods. The dramatic contraction in world 
trade during the financial crisis may have been 
fuelled by the collapse of banks and hence their 
ability to provide credible guarantees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The question to this paper is therefore not whether 
financial development is important for economic 
growth. It obviously plays a role. The question is 
what this role exactly is, and particularly how to look 
at the proliferation of financial innovations which 
appear to have become the most visible manifestation 
of financial development in recent times. Financial 
innovations seem an inherent part of financial 
development, but has the unprecedented level of 
financial innovation in the last decades been good for 
economic growth? No readily available answers 
come to mind. Obviously, when looking at the last 
few years with the economic crisis at the center of 
our attention, it seems hard to argue that recent 
innovations like subprime mortgages and their 
repackaging in marketable securities has been good 
for economic growth. But also this is not carved in 
stone.  
In this context, I also seek to address what 
differential impact can be expected in bank-based 
versus financial market driven economies. 
 
What appears to be true is that the financial sector 
operates as a business in itself rather than just a 
facilitator for the ‘real’ economy. Stiglitz puts it 
succinctly: “the financial sector has become an end in 
itself rather than a means to an end” (Stiglitz, 2010). 
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This might not be surprising, and is hardly new. The 
financial sector is a commercial profit-seeking 
activity driven by high-powered individuals. As we 
know from agency-theory, individuals (at least in 
part) are driven by self-interest and that may deviate 
from the collective interests of society. Hence, 
financial institutions look for profitable opportunities, 
and those may not coincide with choices that 
optimally facilitate the real economy. I will argue 
that particularly the proliferation of information 
technology has facilitated much more rapid changes 
in strategies and actions of financial institutions 
adding friction to their privately optimal actions and 
the interests of society. The severe disruption in the 
2007-2009 financial crisis clearly points at such 
behavior.  
 
Equally importantly, the financial sector at large 
might gain true power and influence in society, and 
even some crowding-out of other economic activities 
may occur. OECD statistics are in this context 
interesting. They show a substantial increase in direct 
contribution to GDP coming from financial services 
in recent decades (OECD, 2009). If crowding-out 
plays a role, this direct contribution could be at the 
expense of their facilitating role. A manifestation of 
this is that banks give less priority to their 
relationship-oriented business (e.g. SME lending) 
and more to transaction-oriented banking. But also 
more indirect types of crowding-out are possible. An 
example of the latter is that the most talented 
students in period 2003-2007 increasingly chose for 
careers in banking, and often pure transaction 
banking (predominantly present in investment 
banking). This could be interpreted as a crowding-out 
of talent at the expense of the real economy. 
Similarly, the boom in the financial sector during 
those years diverted massive resources to this sector. 
For example, many countries came to see the 
financial sector as a growth engine of their 
economies and chose to allocate scarce public 
resources to subsidizing this sector. In my own 
country – The Netherlands – for example substantial 
public investments were made to improve the 
attractiveness of the country as location for financial 
services firms. To the extent that these investments 
were at the expense of other sectors, a true crowding 
out has occurred. In this respect, also the enormous 
lobbying power of the financial services sector is 
noteworthy.    
Nevertheless, the literature rationalizing the role of 
financial markets and financial institutions 
essentially has the financial sector serve as facilitator. 
It facilitates businesses in their funding needs, allows 
for diversification, and serves as liquidity provider. 
The financial sector either acts as broker (e.g. passing 
through money by bringing together buyers and 
sellers of securities, or helping firms raise money in 
the financial markets), or as asset transformer (e.g. 
intermediating liquidity risk by transforming (more) 
liquid liabilities in term loans). The latter distinction 
is particularly relevant because financial systems are 
often characterized as either being bank-based 
(continental Europe) or financial market driven (US, 
UK). In the former, bank financing is dominant while 
direct funding from the financial market plays a more 
important role in the latter. The distinction is not as 
sharp as the dichotomy might suggest, e.g. more than 
half of US businesses is bank-financed; hence no 
system is fully market or bank-driven. But the 
distinction is relevant, and an important question is 
whether the more recent proliferation of financial 
innovations might impact those systems differently. 
In particular, financial innovations have intertwined 
banks and financial markets and this, as I will argue, 
might have impacted bank-based and financial 
market driven economies differently, and could have 
implications for stability.  
 
A fundamental feature of recent financial innovations 
is that they typically are aimed at augmenting 
marketability. Such marketability can augment 
diversification opportunities, yet can also create 
instability. Facilitating marketability is a core 
element of the most noteworthy innovations that 
have become infamous during the 2007-09 financial 
crisis (securitization resulting in securities like CDOs, 
ABCP, and CDS). An important observation is that 
marketability is not always good. The mere fact that 
something becomes tradable can undermine 
commitment. For example, mortgages that become 
tradable might undermine the incentives of the 
originator to monitor the quality of borrowers. Or, 
more fundamentally, when markets exist for all kinds 
of real assets of a firm, a firm can more easily change 
direction of strategy. This might be good, but could 
also lead to lack of commitment (and staying power), 
more impulsive decisions and possible herding. The 
latter refers to the tendency to follow current fads.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 
2, I first add some further thoughts to the link 
between financial development and economic growth.  
Section 3 focuses on bank-based versus financial 
market driven economies. Part of the discussion here 
is to uncover the role that banks play in the economy. 
How does this relate to the role that financial markets 
play? That is, how to compare bank-based to 
financial market focused economies? These 
questions are important from the perspective of 
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analyzing the link between financial development 
and economic growth, and more specifically for the 
role that more recent financial innovations play.  
 
The dichotomy between a bank-based system and a 
financial market-driven economy appears to have 
been weakened. In particular, recent innovations like 
securitization have made banks’ assets more 
marketable and increased the sensitivity of banks to 
financial market developments. Banks have thus 
become a more integral part of financial markets. 
This observation will turn out to be important 
because the stronger links between banks and 
financial markets might well have destabilized banks. 
Securitization – a type of financial innovation is at 
the root of this. This brings me to the question what 
impact financial innovations – as manifestation of a 
more advanced financial development – have. This 
might challenge the largely positive view of financial 
development.  
 
Nevertheless, as I will first show in section 4, there is 
a core literature that convincingly argues that 
financial innovations can – in principle – contribute 
to economic growth. An important element of this is 
the discussion in the modern finance literature on the 
‘spanning’ that innovations can facilitate. That is, 
financial innovations can help complete markets, and 
this could augment social welfare. However, more 
recently, a more negative image has come up. 
Financial innovations could have a destabilizing 
impact; the financial crisis of 2007-09 is arguably a 
manifestation of this.  
 
Section 5 asks the question what causes innovations 
to be potentially value destructive. This asks for an 
understanding how innovations come about. What 
drives the creation of new financial innovations? A 
fundamental feature that comes up here is the 
marketability that recent financial innovations 
typically aim for. As already eluded to, this 
marketability may have a dark side and create 
instability. 
Section 6 seeks to put these insights together 
particularly by comparing the implications of 
financial development and innovation for the more 
bank-based economies of continental Europe to those 
for the financial market driven economies of the UK 
and the US.  
 
Financial development and economic growth 
 
An interesting question about the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth 
is one of causality. Arguably, one could say that this 
is even the key question in much of the older 
literature, and one with strong controversies. On the 
affirmative side, John Hicks (1969) and Joseph 
Schumpeter (1912) see a strong causal link from 
financial development to economic growth. Yet, 
other eminent economists, most notably Joan 
Robinson (1952) and Robert Lucas (1988), are very 
much skeptical about this causality and argue that 
financial development largely follows economic 
development. This is not an innocent controversy.  
Most notably, in recent discussions (see for example 
Buiter, 2009) it is argued that modern macro 
economics – e.g. the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) type of models – do not give 
much of a role to the financial sector. Since Robert 
Lucas is one of the founders of these class of models, 
this might not be surprising. What it means is that 
these models largely ignore the financial sector and 
issues related to financial development cannot readily 
be analyzed in such models (let alone things related 
to financial innovations). As a caveat, one should not 
take the critique on the DSGE models to the extreme; 
some efforts have been made to include financial 
mechanisms like the financial accelerator (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1990). 
Nevertheless, in light of the recent financial crisis, 
questions are raised about the desirability to enrich 
these models by giving a distinct role to the financial 
sector. It might help add understanding to the 
functioning of the economy, and possibly affect 
policy implications that would follow from such 
models. The lack of importance of the financial 
sector in macro-economic research (not surprisingly) 
also shows up in recent textbooks. 
 
A more fundamental view at the importance of 
financial development could help. In a frictionless 
(perfect) world financial development is not 
important. In such world no impediments to an 
optimal resource allocation exist. What that really 
means is that information and transaction costs are 
non-existent. That is, firms have a frictionless access 
to finance, diversification can be accomplished at no 
cost, so can the enforcement of contracts and the 
behavior of firms being financed. Financial 
development matters because all these things are not 
automatically satisfied, or rather never satisfied; 
improvements are always possible and this is what 
financial development could add to.  
 
The lack of focus on financial development in macro-
economics is therefore a direct artifact of the lack of 
frictions that it perceives. This has created a 
dichotomy with micro economics that has very much 
focused on imperfections. In terms of being relevant 
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for policy this has made macro economists somewhat 
ineffective. In particular, they may have not given 
enough support for an institutional design (including 
regulation) that can contain the imperfections (i.e. 
incentive problems) that micro economists did focus 
on.   
 
In any case, the suggestion that financial 
development plays a secondary role is surprising in 
light of the strong links between economic and 
financial development that were already observed 
many years ago. Goldsmith (1969), for example, 
concludes based on data over the period 1860-1963 
that periods of more rapid economic growth go hand 
in hand with an above average rate of economic 
development. Strictly speaking, this says nothing 
about causality, but neither does it refute a 
potentially important (leading) role for financial 
development. In an extensive review of all relevant 
pre-1995 work Ross Levine concludes that “A 
growing body of work would push even most 
skeptics towards the belief that the development of 
financial markets and institutions is a critical and 
inextricable part of the growth process and [would 
push those skeptics] away from the view that the 
financial system is an inconsequential side show, 
responding passively to economic growth and 
industrialization” (Levine, 1997; see also Levine 
2005). 
In more practical terms, the consensus that has 
formed views financial development as an important 
facilitator of economic growth. What has emerged is 
that economic growth may need simultaneous 
financial development. This conclusion has translated 
into the understanding that lack of speed of 
adjustment in the financial sector might hinder 
economic growth. The concern is then that sudden 
real economy needs may not be met because the 
financial sector might only slowly adjust to the needs 
of the real economy. This is an interesting question 
because it bypasses the discussion about causality. 
That is, even if real economic developments are 
leading, the financial sector development determines 
whether the real economy can continue its growth 
path. A sequentially (over time) shifting causality 
between economic growth and financial sector 
development then follows. From this perspective, it 
would seem obvious that financial development is 
good. As we will see, this is not always the case. 
 
An issue that is not, or barely discussed in the 
financial development and economic growth 
literature is the type of financial development, i.e., 
institution-based (say, banks) versus market based 
(financial markets) financial development. This issue, 
I will address next. 
 
Fundamentals of bank versus capital market 
dominated economies. 
 
The standard view is that banks and markets compete, 
so that growth in one is at the expense of the other 
(e.g. Allen and Gale (1995, 1997), and Boot and 
Thakor (1997a,b)).  In this context Deidda and Fattouh 
(2008) show theoretically that both bank and stock 
market development have a positive effect on growth, 
but the growth impact of bank development is lower 
when there is a higher level of stock market 
development.  What this shows is that dynamics of the 
interaction between banks and markets can have real 
effects. How banks and markets interact is therefore of 
great interest. 
 
There is evidence that banks and financial markets not 
just compete, but also are complementary. For 
example, the close monitoring role of banks might 
facilitate timely intervention.  This feature of bank 
lending is valuable to the firm’s bondholders as well.  
They might find it optimal to efficiently delegate the 
timely intervention task to the bank. 
 
Another manifestation of potential complementarities 
between bank lending and capital market activities is 
the increasing importance of securitization.  
Securitization is an example of unbundling of 
financial services and a more recent example of 
financial development. It is a process whereby assets 
are removed from a bank’s balance sheet, so a bank no 
longer permanently fund assets when they are 
securitized; instead, the investors buying asset-backed 
securities provide the funding.  Asset-backed 
securities rather than deposits thus end up funding 
dedicated pools of bank-originated assets. 
Securitization decomposes the lending function such 
that banks no longer fully fund the assets, but continue 
to be involved in other primal lending activities, e.g. 
monitoring and servicing the borrowers. A potential 
benefit of securitization is better risk sharing. The 
proliferation of securitization may however also be 
induced by regulatory arbitrage, e.g. as vehicle to 
mitigate capital regulation, see later. 
 
Central to the extensive academic work on 
securitization is the idea that it is not efficient for 
originators to completely offload the risks in the 
originated assets. The originating bank needs to 
maintain an economic interest in the assets to alleviate 
moral hazard concerns and induce sufficient effort on 
the originating bank’s part in screening and 
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monitoring. What this implies is that even with 
securitization, banks should not become disengaged 
from the assets they originate.  Banks still continue to 
provide the services involved in screening and 
monitoring borrowers, designing and pricing financial 
claims, and providing risk management and loan 
servicing support. As such, securitization preserves 
those functions that are at the core of the raison d’être 
for banks.  This militates against the notion that 
securitization effectively lessens the importance of 
banks.  
 
As the sub-prime crisis of 2007 has shown, this 
development was not without problems.  The structure 
of real world securitization transactions appeared to 
have taken a rather fragile form.  In particular, it is 
important to note that much of the securitization 
leading up to the crisis involved the financing of long-
term assets with short term funding, which induced 
substantial liquidity risk; e.g. as in asset-backed 
commercial paper – ABCP conduits. While this 
liquidity risk was sometimes mitigated by liquidity 
guarantees (e.g. stand-by letters of credit and other 
refinancing commitments), the underwriting 
institutions often underestimated the risks involved 
and overstretched themselves  
 
Recent events clearly point at the sub optimality of 
such strategies.  Originating institutions behaved as if 
they retained minimal residual risk. As a consequence, 
monitoring incentives may have been compromised 
(see Mian and Sufi, 2007).  The eagerness of banks to 
securitize claims – and keep the “repackaging 
machine” rolling – may have also adversely impacted 
the quality of loans that were originated through a 
dilution of banks’ screening incentives due to lower 
retained residual risks (e.g. sub-prime lending). Credit 
rating agencies have played an important role in this 
process as well. Their willingness to provide favorable 
ratings clearly helped in growing this market. 
 
A positive view of credit rating agencies is that they 
play a similar certification role (in the financial 
market) as banks do with bank loans. As rating 
agencies become more sophisticated and reliable, the 
certification role of banks diminishes in importance, 
causing bank borrowers to migrate to the capital 
market.  In this sense, rating agencies intensify the 
competition between banks and markets.  But they 
also pull banks into the capital market. For example, 
banks originate loans that they securitize, and then 
seek ratings for the securitized pools from rating 
agencies.  The ratings, in turn, facilitate the ability of 
banks to sell (securitized) asset-backed securities in 
the capital market. Rating agencies then play a role 
as gatekeeper (Coffee, 2002). 
This rather positive interpretation of rating 
agencies, and does by the way not really address the 
question about stability. Rating agencies are clouded 
somewhat by recent negative publicity.  In the 2001 
crisis surrounding Enron, rating agencies were 
accused of being strategically sluggish in 
downgrading. More recently, they have been blamed 
(in part) for the sub-prime crisis in which they were 
allegedly too lenient in rating the senior tranches in 
securitization transactions.  Allegations have been 
made about conflicts of interest for rating agencies 
arising from the fact that structured finance is (was) a 
source of ever-increasing income for them, which 
then corrupts their incentives for accurately rating the 
issuers involved in structured finance (Cantor, 2004; 
Partnoy, 1999).  In this context, Coffee and Sale 
(2008) point at the naiveté to think that reputation 
building incentives alone would keep credit rating 
agencies in check.  
Of particular concern are the so-called 
“rating triggers.”  For example, some debt contracts 
may dictate accelerated debt repayments when the 
rating falls.  The consequences of such accelerated 
debt repayments might, however, be so severe as to 
cause rating agencies to become reluctant to lower 
the ratings of those borrowers in a timely manner.  
Complications also arise from the role played by the 
so-called “monoliners.”  These are insurers who 
traditionally guaranteed municipal bonds but now 
also guarantee the lowest-risk (best) tranches in 
securitization transactions. These insurers became 
virtually indispensible in the sense that the viability 
of many forms of securitization was predicated on 
this type of “reinsurance.”  However, the ability of 
the monoliners to issue credible guarantees (and 
hence their role in securitization) depends on these 
institutions themselves having AAA ratings.  This 
potentially generates an indirect chain-reaction 
mechanism for rating agencies.  In rating (and 
monitoring) the monoliners, rating agencies affect 
the viability of the securitization market.  Thus, the 
impact of rating agencies is both direct (rating 
securitization tranches) and indirect (rating the 
monoliners).  The potential failure of such 
monoliners has (had) a significant effect on the value 
of various structured finance products and induces an 
additional chain reaction among players active in the 
structured finance market, including investors.  This 
further underscores the increasing interlinkages in the 
financial markets. Rating agencies appear to have 
provided little stability, and might even have elevated 
instability. 
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The 2007-2009 financial crisis brought securitization 
almost to a grinding halt. However, the risk-
diversification that securitization can accomplish 
appears to be of more than just ephemeral importance.  
Thus, I expect securitization to reemerge, albeit 
possibly in a form that entails lower levels of liquidity 
risk, as well as lesser moral hazard in screening (loan 
underwriting standards) and monitoring.  A caveat is 
that some of the activity in securitization may have 
been induced merely by capital arbitrage, in which 
case its social value may be rather limited; the new 
Basel II capital requirements – and particularly the 
so-called Basel III amendments – may diminish such 
regulatory arbitrage.   
 
Another effect of the interaction between banks and 
markets is that as markets evolve and entice bank 
borrowers away, banks have an incentive to create 
new products and services that combine services 
provided by markets with those provided by banks.  
This allows banks to “follow their customers” to the 
market rather than losing them.  There are numerous 
examples.  For instance, when a borrower goes to the 
market to issue commercial paper, its bank can 
provide a back-up line of credit in order to guarantee 
refinacing.  Securitization of various sorts is another 
example in that banks not only originate the loans that 
are pooled and securitized, but they also buy various 
securitized tranches as investment securities.  The 
impetus for such market-based activities grows 
stronger as interbank competition puts pressure on 
profit margins from traditional banking products and 
the capital market provides access to greater liquidity 
and lower cost of capital for the bank’s traditional 
borrowers.  As a consequence, there is a natural 
propensity for banks to become increasingly integrated 
with markets, and a sort of unprecedented “co-
dependence” emerges that makes banking and capital 
market risks become increasingly intertwined. This 
could make banks more willing to engage in lending 
and hence improve access to financing, but also points 
at potentially a higher level of instability. One 
conclusion that I will draw is that this improves access 
to finance under ‘normal’ circumstances, yet makes 
access more volatile and subject to the boom-and-bust 
nature of financial markets. This comes back in the 
next section. 
 
Understanding the pros of financial innovation 
 
The notion that financial innovation is good for 
economic growth is based on the idea that such 
innovations will improve the allocation of capital. In 
the words of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, “The 
increasing sophistication and depth of financial 
markets promote economic growth by allocating 
capital where it can be most productive” (Bernanke, 
2007). This sounds politically correct, and by its very 
generality difficult to refute. However, more 
specificity is needed. What can precisely be good 
about financial innovations? In a first best world 
where information is available to everybody, and 
everybody is capable of fully discerning all relevant 
attributes, financial innovations could help complete 
the market, i.e., facilitate a complete set of Arrow-
Debreu securities. This is the typical ‘spanning’ 
argument; financial innovations are good because 
they help complete the market. 
 
As a more or less immediate corollary, financial 
development (and financial innovations) might help 
improve the allocation of capital. In more simple 
terms, a complete market allows individuals to 
optimally hedge, cq smooth, their income over time. 
Given this higher level of predictability that results, 
they can abscond of their money for longer periods 
of time facilitating more long-term investments. 
 
Similarly, the tradability of debt and equity in 
financial markets allows investors to liquefy their 
holdings at any point in time (i.e. by selling their 
holdings to other investors) and helps in diversifying 
risks. Also this helps firms in obtaining long(er) term 
financing. This also helps explain the introduction of 
limited liability in equity-type contracts. This 
facilitates trading, and in doing so allows investors to 
liquefy claims on otherwise long-term investments 
(Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
Liquidity therefore is valuable, yet, as we will see, 
can simultaneously have some negative 
repercussions. More specifically, in a world with 
imperfections, agency and information problems lead 
to potential distortions that can show a dark side of 
liquidity. 
 
Financial innovations also valuable for other 
reasons… 
New securities are sometimes introduced to help 
overcome information asymmetries. For example, in 
the costly-state-verification literature it is shown that 
firms may have access to loans because these can be 
provided at relatively low cost. The idea is that an 
equity type claim would suffer from a lemon problem: 
outsiders would not be able to assess the value and 
hence refuse to provide funding since the firm could 
try to exploit a too optimistic view among potential 
investors about the firm. As put forward in Akerlof’s 
(1970) famous paper, investors would be naive to 
buy a firm’s equity at an average price because only 
the below average firms would happily be willing to 
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sell the equity at that price. Investors thus face a 
problem of adverse selection and the market may 
break down.  
 
Note that things might not be that bad if there is a 
very low cost in verifying the true state of nature 
which would help enforce the ensuing obligations. 
That is, if the lemon problem can be easily overcome 
by verifying the true state at relatively low cost 
equity financing might be available. However if the 
verification cost is high this may not work. A debt 
claim may now help since with debt (contrary to 
equity) verification is not always needed. That is, if 
debt is repaid (interest plus principal) there is no 
need to verify. If it is not repaid (or only in part) one 
needs to verify whether there is indeed a lack of 
resources. Having a debt contract in conjunction with 
a third party (bankruptcy court?) that can impose a 
stiff penalty on the firm if it falsely claims 
insufficiency of funds solves the misrepresentation 
problem. Unless the debt is issued by a very risky 
firm the anticipated costs of verification are limited 
since in most cases the firm can and will repay (and 
no verification is needed). Note that in the case of 
external equity there is no fixed payment and 
verification is always needed. The upshot of this is 
that a debt security can be seen as a value enhancing 
innovation to help facilitate access to funding (see 
the earlier contribution of Gale and Hellwig, 1984; 
and also Tirole, 2006). 
 
The literature on financial innovation – also referred 
to as the security design literature – has come up with 
various approaches to mitigate problems of 
information asymmetry. One that also rationalizes 
debt as a valuable security is Boot and Thakor (1993). 
They show that if information production costs are 
not excessive, introducing debt in the capital 
structure of firms could encourage information 
production in equity financial markets. This would 
then via trading in the financial market get prices 
closer to the underlying true value. The idea is with 
debt in a firm’s capital structure, the equity becomes 
riskier, but importantly more information sensitive. 
Hence, the value of producing information about the 
firm goes up, more information is produced as a 
result, and prices are pushed towards their real value 
(see also Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001). All this would 
be good for resource allocation because mispricing is 
mitigated.  
 
Others have argued that a rights issue – again a 
financial innovation – could help solve the lemon 
problem. With a rights issue existing shareholders get 
the right to buy the newly issued shares. In essence, 
if only existing shareholders buy the new shares that 
a firm wants to issue, the pricing is not that important. 
Why? Observe that when shares are issued at a price 
that is too low, new shareholders get a windfall gain 
at the expense of existing shareholders. With a rights 
issue (in principle) the new shares go pro rata to the 
existing shareholders; gains and losses are now in 
one and the same hand, i.e. internalized by the same 
group of investors. A right issue may therefore allow 
the firm to raise new equity while a ‘normal’ equity 
issue would have been infeasible because of a lemon 
problem. This is important because it highlights that 
existing shareholders may continue to provide 
financing. In a different context this is also what 
happens with venture capital financed firms; this 
typically involves a small group of investors. 
 
The security design literature provides several other 
examples of financial innovations that could resolve 
particular agency- and asymmetric information 
problems. For example, convertible bonds could give 
bondholders protection against risk-seeking behavior 
by shareholders. The idea is that in a situation where 
a lot of debt already exists, new debt financing might 
not be available because it might induce shareholders 
to favor excessive risk. That is, their leveraged claim 
gives them an enormous upside potential if risks 
work out, while the down side is born by the 
debtholders. With convertible debt, debtholders will 
share in the upside if risks work out (i.e. conversion 
will then occur). This will make matters somewhat 
more balanced because shareholders no longer 
exclusively get the upside which discourages risk 
taking. Thus equity-like financing might possibly be 
available.  
 
In all these theories financial innovation is something 
good; it tries to mitigate or resolve a particular 
friction and (ultimately) benefits the underlying real 
activity. Other motivations for introducing financial 
innovations include regulatory arbitrage and 
minimizing transaction costs. Whether this is good or 
bad depends on the particular context. For example, 
innovations designed to bypass regulations 
(regulatory arbitrage) could be good if one considers 
those regulations not desirable. But assuming that the 
regulation involved has merit, say capital 
requirements imposed on banks, innovations that are 
only aimed at bypassing them should probably be 
viewed negatively. Reducing transaction costs as 
rationale for financial innovations can often be 
viewed more positively. If certain frictions – 
transaction costs – impede the optimal allocation of 
capital then innovations that reduce these seem 
optimal. In this positive interpretation, innovations 
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like credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO) would promote an optimal 
allocation of capital by reducing the cost of 
diversifying and reallocating risk. However, as Posen 
and Hinterschweiger (2009) note during the period 
2003-2008 the growth in OTC derivatives outpaced 
that of real investment by a factor of twelve (300 
versus 25 percent). And after 2006 real investments 
stagnated while OTC derivatives grew arguably 
faster than ever. While this does not preclude that the 
proliferation of these financial instruments provided 
benefits also later in the boom, the negative effects 
on the robustness of the financial system – as 
observed in 2007-2009 – tend to refute this.  
 
 Innovations might be problematic 
 
Johnson and Kwak (2009) state that a financial 
innovation is only good if it “enables an 
economically productive use of money that would 
not otherwise occur”. This statement makes it clear 
that financial innovations do not necessarily add 
value. This might particularly be the case when 
information asymmetries are present. 
 
When information asymmetries are present and 
particular contingencies are not contractible, having 
complete markets is infeasible.. This happens when 
contingencies are not verifiable, and/or too costly to 
verify. Introducing a financial innovation might now 
have a much darker motivation. For example, 
introducing financial innovations might be intended 
to fool market participants. An example might be the 
Dutch or UK market for life insurance products. On 
several occasions structural misspelling has occurred 
with as common denominator: the presence of an 
excessive variety of product innovations that share 
one characteristic: complexity in conjunction with 
obscurity of costs relative to potential benefits.         
 
Financial innovations would then tend to worsen the 
allocation of capital.  The more recent advances in 
securitization could be interpreted that way too. 
Initially securitization could have allowed for a wider 
access to investors, reduced funding costs and hence 
improved lending opportunities for banks. As stated 
earlier, this may well have been value enhancing. 
There is a logic in fulfilling the demand for high 
investment grade securities by packaging mortgages, 
and selling the low risk portion to (distant) investors. 
As long as the originators of the loans keep the more 
risky layer, they would still have a strong incentive to 
screen loan applicants and monitor them. What 
happened subsequently is less benign. It is clear that 
lending standards weakened. In part this had little to 
do with securitization. The housing boom in the US 
seduced lenders in granting higher mortgages. As 
long as prices kept rising, loans could always be 
refinanced and/or sales of underlying houses would 
cover the outstanding mortgages. Where 
securitization did come into the picture is that the 
insatiable appetite for AAA paper in the market 
pushed financial institutions into a high gear 
repacking mode, ultimately lowering standards even 
further. Also, in a desire to issue as much AAA paper 
as possible, the more risky tranches of securitization 
structures were repackaged again, and more AAA 
paper was squeezed out. All this packaging and 
repackaging led to very complicated securities. When 
the market finally started questioning the 
sustainability of the housing boom, the arcane 
securities were suddenly out of favor. 
 
Financial innovations often cause harm by reducing 
transparency, and this might be deliberate. The 
earlier example about life insurance – as stated – 
might be a good example about that. While 
securitization did create arcane products (the 
sequentially repacked claims), the objective of 
securitization might not have been to create this lack 
of transparency. The arcane nature of the end product 
might have been a side effect of the sequential 
repackaging that was driven to ‘squeeze out’ as much 
triple-A paper as possible. In practice this may still 
have had the same effect: some market participants 
got fooled in trusting the quality of this highly rated 
paper (and the willingness of rating agencies to grant 
such high ratings did help, see also Box 1).   
 
The more fundamental observation – and the one 
already mentioned in the previous section – is that 
securitization is a financial innovation that 
intertwines banks with financial markets. Financial 
markets are however subject to booms and busts, or 
better heavily momentum driven. As long as 
momentum was there, the market’s appetite could not 
be saturated, and much money could be made by 
putting the ‘repackaging machines’ in higher and 
higher gear. The important observation is that recent 
financial innovations are typically linked to financial 
markets, and financial markets have this boom and 
bust nature.   
 
Marketability and excessive ‘changeability’ key… 
Securitization has opened up the bank balance sheet. 
Many bank assets have potentially become 
marketable. This marketability is typically seen as 
something positive, but the links with the financial 
markets that this has created has made banks 
potentially more vulnerable vis-à-vis the volatility and 
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momentum in financial markets. Moreover, 
marketability means that existing activities and risks 
can be changed almost instantaneously. Since 
financial markets go through cycles and are subjected 
to hypes, the banks’ decisions might become more 
momentum driven. This adds further instability.  
 
Elsewhere (Boot, 2009), I frame this ability to change 
things almost instantaneously as a move to more 
‘footloose corporations’. What I mean by this is that 
corporations (or banks for that matter) due to the 
proliferation of financial markets and the increased 
marketability of their operations (creating a 
transaction orientation) become uprooted, meaning 
lose a degree of fixity and stability. This discussion is 
also related to the general corporate governance  
question on the rights of shareholders and the role of 
private equity investors in particular. While different 
opinions exist, typically it is considered important that 
management has some mandate (i.e. elbow room) vis 
a vis shareholders. In related work by Boot, Gopalan 
and Thakor (2008), the emphasis is on the need of 
having some stable shareholders. The liquidity stock 
markets provide may cause ownership to be changing 
all the time such that no stable and lasting link with 
shareholders comes about. This could make firms 
even more sensitive to financial market pressures. In 
Box 2 I provide a brief summary of the key insights of 
the Boot (2009) study. 
The uprooting of firms – footloose corporations – is a 
reinforcing process. The financial market perspective 
tends to result in excessive volatility and instability 
within firms, which damage the social fabric. 
Companies have accentuated this by giving in to the 
pressures from those same financial markets. They 
are tempted to organize themselves in such a way 
that they become divisible; instead of striving for 
internal synergies, they have created separate, easily 
accountable units. And yes, that further erodes the 
social fabric and so leads to even more transactions, 
which in turn continue to fuel the process of 
decomposition. And so a kind of vicious circle forms. 
 At the same time, such a process can be seen 
affecting the behavior of both senior management 
and employees. As soon as the CEO lets his position 
be dictated by the fickleness of the financial markets, 
he becomes like a (temporary) mercenary of the 
financial market. He either has momentum or he does 
not. It is all or nothing, with the concomitant increase 
in the turnover of senior executives. This results in 
the boardroom’s effective alienation from the rest of 
the organization, undoubtedly accompanied by 
numerous transactions, and again it is the social 
fabric of the organization which suffers. All those 
transactions, plus the alienation – whether real or 
only perceived – of those supposed to be running the 
company, encourages the rest of the workforce to 
give in to calculating self-interest. “What’s in it for 
me?,” they ask themselves. Their ties to the 
organization more or less collapse to solely their 
financial remuneration contract. Self-serving 
behavior then becomes the norm. For instance, they 
start to overly invest in developing marketable skills 
– those of use to any employer – rather than abilities 
specific to the company itself. And so another 
vicious circle is created. The key challenge facing 
businesses is to recognize these self-reinforcing 
processes and to counter those effectively. 
Leadership requires vision, and it is essential that 
management creates elbow room to maneuver. A 
mandate is key. The reality is that management can 
claim this mandate. For shareholders, 
notwithstanding everything that has been said, it is 
very difficult to intervene. It is management’s own 
fixation with highly visible share prices and with the 
circus of analysts and consultants which underlies its 
capitulation to the financial markets. 
More on the dark side of marketability  Creating 
liquidity and opening up markets, i,e, trading 
possibilities, is typically seen as something positive. 
But this is not always the case as follows from the 
previous section. One application is the context first 
investigated by Amar Bhide (1993). His insight was 
that the liquidity of stock markets is typically 
considered a virtue, yet may have a dark side in that 
fully liquid stock markets encourage diffuse 
ownership, and this may undermine monitoring 
incentives. Hence corporate control over managers 
might be lax inducing inefficiencies. In other words, 
monitoring incentives typically require a larger and 
enduring stake in a company, yet this is at odds with 
liquidity. This suggests a trade-off between liquidity 
and a more enduring presence by committing not to 
sell. In subsequent research Bolton and Von Thadden 
(1998) have shown that stock market liquidity may 
benefit from the simultaneous presence of a few 
block holders. That is, having some proportion of 
shares freely traded but not all, may help create 
liquidity in the freely traded shares in part because 
the market knows that some investors have a more 
sizable and permanent (minority) stake that gives 
them an incentive to monitor. In this way some 
agency problems at the level of the firm might be 
mitigated. This is in line with the earlier discussed 
work of Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2008) who focus 
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on the pros and cons of (lack of) stability in the 
shareholder base particularly in the context of 
exchange listed firms. 
  
The costs of liquidity and/or marketability can be 
further emphasized in the context of financial sector 
stability. This can be linked to securitization (see 
earlier), but also to the stability of investment banks 
vs commercial (relationship oriented) banks. 
Traditional relationship oriented banks seem 
incentivized to build up institutional franchise value. 
Individuals are part of the organization as an entity, 
and not readily identifiable as individual stars. In 
other words, the value created is fixed to the 
organizational entity and not portable as part of 
individuals. 
 
Investment bank on the other hand, seems more 
based on the individual star concept with high 
marketability of individuals. As a consequence, less 
institutional franchise value is build up; individual 
franchise values dominate. If this the only difference 
then the relationship banking institution has implied 
value, while the investment bank has little implied 
value, and hence Keeley (1990) analysis would 
suggest that an investment bank would take lot of 
risk, while the franchise value of a commercial bank 
would help curtail its risk taking. 
 
Historically investment banks have solved this 
marketability problem (and potential lack of 
institutional franchise value) by having partnerships. 
The partnership structure has two dimensions that 
jointly resolve the risk taking problem and 
marketability (and star phenomenon): 
- a partnership means that bankers have their 
personal wealth tied up in the business –they 
own the equity claim themselves. 
- Simultaneously, the partnership structure 
means that the equity is not (optimally) 
marketable. 
 
The latter implies that ‘stars’ cannot take their money 
out, or only at a reduced value. Implicitly, this also 
means typically that franchise value is created this 
way, and this value is transferred over time (to future 
partners). Interesting examples exist where 
institutions have made changes that have destroyed 
this structure. For example, in an initial public 
offering (converting a partnership in a listed 
shareholder owned company) the current partners 
effectively expropriate all franchise value that has 
been build up over time. Even worse, once the 
partnership is gone, stars are no longer ‘under 
control’. Their financial interest is no longer tied to 
the firm. This elevates risk and reduces stability. 
 
One way of interpreting the developments in banking 
is that even in commercial banking more of the 
business has become marketable, and the ‘star’ 
phenomenon may also come up there. In any case 
partnerships among major financial institutions are 
no longer common. Changes, whether in the form of 
financial innovations (products), processes 
(securitization) or institutional changes (the demise 
of a partnership in lieu of an exchange listing with 
marketable equity) all work in the same direction. 
They make things footloose and in doing so could 
undermine stability. These links between 
marketability and financial sector stability (and the 
real economy) are important in the context of 
evaluating financial development and financial 
innovations. 
 
Putting it together: what to conclude? 
What has been shown is that financial innovations 
can be good from the perspective of completing 
markets, as well as from a perspective that focuses on 
overcoming asymmetric information and agency 
problems. Nevertheless, a much more negative 
picture can be drawn. Innovations might be designed 
to fool market participants, and in doing so cause 
serious harm (see Henderson and Pearson, 2009). 
The instability that they might cause is arguable even 
more worrisome. This red flag is related to the earlier 
observation that financial innovations often make 
things (e.g. banks!) intertwined with financial 
markets, and that those financial markets are subject 
to booms and busts, or better heavily momentum 
driven. The question then is when do financial 
innovations destabilize things, as securitization might 
have done to banks. 
It is very difficult to come up with conditions that 
help us distinguish between value enhancing and 
value destroying innovations. My discussion on the 
value of partnerships points at the need for some 
‘fixed points’, not everything can be fluid. 
Marketability definitely has a dark side; it potentially 
causes severe instability. 
 
When we take a bigger picture and focus on 
innovation in the financial sector not just in the 
product sense but also in processes and institutional 
structure more can be said. Recall that the type of 
innovations encompasses products (financial 
innovations in the strict sense), processes 
(securitization) and institutional changes (e.g. the 
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demise of a partnership in lieu of an exchange listing 
with marketable equity). The institutional structure at 
the most aggregate level was discussed in section 3 
where bank-dominated versus capital market 
dominated economies were discussed. As I 
emphasized, financial innovations in the product 
sense are often linked to financial markets, and 
effectively bring bank-dominated intermediation 
closer to the financial market. 
 
What has not been discussed is that bank-based 
systems versus market-driven systems might also 
deviate in terms of their openness to real innovations. 
There is a body of work (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 
2001; Boot and Thakor, 1997a) that argues that being 
bank-based gives too much power to existing 
institutions and businesses at the expense of new 
activities and initiatives. This could retard real 
innovation and renewal. A bank-based system is 
more conservative, particularly more incumbent 
oriented, and hence less able to take advantage of 
new opportunities. This suggests a trade-off between 
a more volatile market-based system and a less 
innovative, yet possibly more stable banking system.  
 
In work by Allen (1993), Carlin and Mayer (2002), 
and more recently Herrera and Minetti (2007), the 
message is that truly path breaking innovations are 
better facilitated in financial market dominated 
economies (like the US), while bank-dominated 
economies could possibly be better in 
accommodating more gradual innovations. In Allen 
(1993) this is linked to the information aggregation 
role of financial markets that might be crucial for 
assessing unknown path breaking innovations. In 
Herrera and Minetti (2007), the arguments are more 
linked to the reasoning in Rajan and Zingales (2001) 
in that a bank may want to obstruct path breaking 
innovations that may render its information about the 
firm obsolete (i.e. the bank may seek to preserve its 
hold-up power over the borrower). Carlin and 
Mayer’s (2002) empirical results seem to support 
these observations. 
 
Following the overview of findings in my 2007 study 
for the OECD (Boot, 2007) focusing on The 
Netherlands, a bank-dominated nature of the 
financial sector would then translate into difficulty of 
financing more radical innovations. Given the 
information induced switching costs (hold-up 
problems), SME firms may face constraints on 
availability of financing, and this would particularly 
show in those cases where collateral is not readily 
available. Again this would be in more innovative 
firms. The focus on incumbents that a highly 
concentrated bank-dominated system can induce 
would be most apparent with (newer) high growth 
firms and SME’s.  
 
The level of product (e.g. CDS) and process financial 
innovation (securitization) observed in the recent past 
have definitely affected the institutional landscape. 
The long-term implications for the structure of the 
banking industry are not yet clear. More 
concentration is definitely a possibility. Whether the 
financial sector becomes more or less bank-
dominated is not clear either. What the new 
equilibrium looks like and what the implications are 
for potential financing frictions are (e.g. the ones 
mentioned just above) is therefore an open issue. 
 
I have emphasized potential complementarities 
between banks and financial markets. On the positive 
side one could say that financial innovations have 
possibly strengthened these complementarities. One 
could however easily draw a more negative 
conclusion. In the  2007-09 financial crisis European 
banks have arguably been hit most. One 
interpretation is that the European financial sector 
started combining the worst of both worlds: it 
continued to be bank-driven with its negative effects 
on renewal and entrepreneurship, yet these very same 
banks became intertwined with financial markets and 
as a consequence volatility increased and the benefits 
of stability disappeared. 
 
This is clearly linked to the observation that financial 
innovations are to some extent opportunistic. They 
are part of a more open financial system. This gives 
potentially more instability but also allows for more 
immediate possibilities to take advantage of 
opportunities. What comes out of this paper is that 
we need to (learn to) deal with the instability that 
marketability brings. The proliferation of 
marketability clearly has a dark side. Particularly the 
continental European bank-dominated financial 
sectors need to find a new equilibrium in this fluid 
world. 
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